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1. Introduction  
Since the DeBondt and Thaler’s (1985) finding of past losers outperforming past winners, long 
term contrarian performance has been reported across both developed and developing markets 
(Clare and Thomas, 1995; Dissanaike, 1997; Wongchoti and Pyun, 2005; Antoniou et al., 2005; 
Chou et al., 2007; McInish et al., 2008; Wu and Li, 2011). While the existence of contrarian 
performance is generally accepted, explaining the cause of and identifying the source of 
contrarian performance have been more controversial. DeBondt and Thaler (1985) and Daniel et 
al. (1998) propose the overreaction hypothesis for the long term contrarian performance. In their 
views, when a stock has experienced a string of good news or a period of growth, investors may 
incorrectly believe that growth will continue and pushes the stock’s price higher than it is 
justified by the news. The stock price later reverses when investors realise that mistakes were 
made. Fama and French (1993; 1996) disagree with the overreaction hypothesis and contend that 
the outperformance of losers over winners is due to high distress costs in loser stocks. Consistent 
with the Fama and French’s view, Conrad and Kaul (1993) and Ball et. al, (1995) identify low-
priced stocks as the main source of contrarian performance, since many losers are in the low 
price category with a high distress cost relative to winners. This debate is centred on whether 
low-priced stocks are solely responsible for contrarian performance and whether contrarian 
performance is a mispricing effect or a reflection of the risk-return paradigm. This paper 
contributes to this debate by investigating whether contrarian performance is driven by low-
priced stocks on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The LSE is one of most important capital 
markets in the world outside U.S., and provides an alternative institutional setting which is 
dominated by many small and low-priced stocks
1
. 
Stock price itself should not affect stock performance in a frictionless market (Weld, et al, 2009). 
However, recent theoretical and empirical literature suggests that stock price in a market with 
frictions is likely used by investors to make investment decisions which in turn may affect stock 
return. Barberis and Shliefer (2003) develop a model where investors categorize risky assets into 
                                                          
1
 With approximately 3,000 LSE listed stocks, the FTSE 100 index, which includes 100 largest UK domestic stocks 
by market capitalisation, represents 84.35% (as at 30 June 20011) of market capitalisation in the LSE. Further 
information on the FTSE family of indices can be found at www.ftse.com.  
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different investment styles and move funds among these styles depending on their relative 
performance which generates co-movement in returns unrelated to co-movement in cash-flows. 
In their analysis they discuss price-dependent styles where price is the characteristic defining the 
styles such as value and small stock investing. Consistent with the model of Barberis and 
Shliefer (2003), Green and Hwang (2009) and Greenwood (2008) find that investors categorize 
stocks based on price and this behaviour is not explained by firm fundamentals. These studies 
suggest that contrarian performance potentially comes from stocks in a certain price range. Since 
stock price is positively correlated with institutional ownership (Kumar and Lee, 2006) and firm 
size (Green and Hwang, 2009), and negatively with transaction costs (Weld et al. 2009), low-
priced stocks can be intuitively considered as a main source for long term contrarian 
performance. In addition, low-priced stocks contain a large amount of distress costs relative to 
high- or middle-priced stocks (Loughran and Ritter 1996). Therefore, it is important to examine 
whether risk alone can explain away contrarian performance particularly generated by low-
priced stocks.   
Our preliminary results show that overall contrarian performance measured by buying 5-year 
losers and selling 5-year winners is significantly positive and it is mainly driven by positive loser 
returns. To find out the source of contrarian performance we further break down overall 
contrarian performance at high, middle, and low price levels. In the cross-sectional analysis, we 
find that contrarian performance at each price level is positive, although contrarian performance 
at the high price level is weakly significant. This evidence suggests that contrarian performance 
is less dependent on price and is not from low-priced stocks alone.  When we use the Fama-
French (1993) three-factor model to obtain risk adjusted returns, only contrarian performance at 
the middle price level remains significantly positive. Furthermore, low-priced loser and middle-
priced loser portfolios have significant positive returns. Finally, we use the liquidity augmented 
CAPM model (Liu, 2006) to obtain risk adjusted returns. We find that positive returns of low-
priced losers disappear and that positive returns of middle-priced losers still persist, implying 
that liquidity risk plays an important role in explaining low-priced stocks’ contrarian 
performance. Overall, our results reveal that contrarian performance is not solely driven by low-
priced stocks. In fact, both liquid risk and distress risk have some power in explaining contrarian 
performance generated by low-priced stocks. However, contrarian performance generated by 
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middle-priced stocks persists after controlling for the two risks. These results imply that 
contrarian performance is more likely to be a mispricing effect supporting the overreaction 
hypothesis. Our results are also consistent with the value style investing model of Barberis and 
Shliefer (2003) in which investors choose liquid value stocks rather than illiquid value stocks to 
exploit contrarian performance.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature. The hypotheses are 
developed in section 3, while section 4 outlines the sample and the methodology. Section 5 
reports the empirical results. Finally, section 6 provides our conclusions.  
2. Literature Review 
While the outperformance of loser stocks relative to winner stocks is generally accepted, 
explanations for this anomaly have been divided in two strands, a mispricing effect or the risk-
return trade-off. Daniel et al. (1998), Barberis et al. (1998) and Hong and Stein (1999, 2000) 
invoke psychological evidence to motivate a price overreaction hypothesis in line with a general 
prediction of the behavioural decision theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1982). According to 
these views, a mispricing effect emanates from investors overreacting to market news in the 
short-term. When they correct their prior mistakes, price reverts to fundamental value over the 
long term. However, Lo and MacKinlay (1990) report that stock returns have positive cross-
correlations which can likely reconcile with negative autocorrelations in individual stock return. 
They contend that contrarian profits are not driven by investor overreaction alone. Fama and 
French (1993; 1996) instead argue that long-term contrarian performance can be accommodated 
in the risk return paradigm, reflecting that losers are riskier than winners in terms of distress risk. 
Consistent with this, Fama and French (1995) show that a high book-to-market equity ratio, as a 
proxy for distress cost, predicts poor future earnings. Zhang’s (2005) model supports Fama and 
French’s conclusions providing an analytical framework where value stocks’ additional riskiness 
emanates from their inability to scale down capital investment during market downturns. 
Furthermore, Fama (1998), Fama and French (2006) and LaPorta (1996) claim that long-term 
contrarian performance is the result of a mis-measured relationship between risk and return. In 
contrast, Daniel and Titman (1997) and Lakonishok et al. (1994) find that value stocks 
outperform growth stocks because of investors over-estimating future growth rates of growth 
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stocks relative to value stocks. Therefore, it is still controversial in the literature whether the 
value factor in the Fama and French (1993) model is a mispricing effect or a proxy for risk. Liu 
(2006) develops the liquidity augmented CAPM model in which liquidity risk is modeled in 
addition to market risk. Liu (2006) contend that positive returns of losers are potentially 
attributable to a high liquidity risk which is compensated for investors holding illiquid loser 
stocks.   
 
In the literature, there are also some studies showing that the main source of contrarian 
performance may persist at certain price range. Conrad and Kaul (1993) argue that the bid-ask 
spread is high in low-priced stocks and that long-term contrarian performance is a low-price 
effect. However, Loughran and Ritter (1996) find that after controlling for bid-ask spread and 
survivorship bias contrarian performance persists. Recent empirical evidence reveals that 
investor behaviour is also sensitive to price and in turn may affect stock return. Barberis and 
Shleifer (2003) provide a theoretical framework for understanding investment styles. In their 
model investors simplify their investment decisions by grouping assets into styles rather than 
across individual stocks, and allocate funds into style categories which generate co-movement. 
Small stocks and value stocks which are relatively low-priced are two typical styles which they 
include in the price dependent category. Green and Hwang (2009) support Barberis and 
Shleifer’s (2003) theoretical framework by providing empirical evidence that investors 
categorise stocks by price. They find that comovement between similarly priced stocks cannot be 
explained by market frictions and firm fundamentals, while price based portfolios explain 
variation in stock-level returns. Dyl and Elliott (2006), Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Kumar 
and Lee (2006) document a positive correlation between stock price and institutional ownership, 
suggesting that institutional (individual) investors might prefer high (low)-priced stocks. 
Collectively, these papers suggest that contrarian performance is more likely to persist in small, 
value, and relatively low-priced stocks.  
The ability of the January effect to explain contrarian performance has also been investigated. 
Zarowin (1990) documents that return reversals can be attributed to the superior positive 
performance of small firms in January, whereas Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) find that 
consistent losers experience significantly positive returns in January which they attribute to tax-
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loss selling at the tax year end. George and Hwang (2007) provide a unified tax explanation for 
both loser and winner reversals. They show that winner reversals are driven by investors’ 
incentive to delay capital-gain tax payments, while loser reversals are caused by tax-loss selling 
at the tax year end
2
. These papers support the view that strategic tax planning can help explain 
contrarian performance. 
 
In the context of the UK market, Clare and Thomas (1995) investigate contrarian performance 
for a sample of 1000 UK stocks and the potential for profit from implementing a contrarian 
investment strategy from 1955 to 1990. They support the overreaction hypothesis, but attribute 
their findings to a size effect. Dissanaike (1997, 1999) employs a sample of FTSE 500 firms 
from 1975-1991 and confirms investor overreaction not driven by a size effect. Antoniou et al. 
(2006) use weekly data of 1645 LSE stocks and find that contrarian performance exists in the UK 
market where large capitalization stocks are the main driving force for contrarian performance. 
Wu and Li (2011) use constituent stocks in FTSE All Share Index from 1979 to 2009 in the UK 
and investigate whether delaying capital gain tax payment can explain winner reversals. They 
find that growth stocks rather than stocks with a large amount of capital gains drive winner 
reversals over the long term.    
In the literature, it remains unclear whether low-priced stocks are the main driving force for 
contrarian performance. This is the main focus of the paper. The LSE is an important capital 
market in the world, and it provides an alternative institutional setting to investigate the 
contribution of low-priced stocks to contrarian performance. As at the end of June 2011, the 
FTSE 250 index, which is comprised of 250 largest UK domestic firms by market capitalisation, 
represented 96% of total market capitalisation, implying the remaining 4% of market value for a 
vast majority of the number of listed firms. Our investigation of LSE listed stocks can offer new 
insights into the debate between mispricing or risk based explanations for contrarian 
performance. 
3. Hypothesis Development 
                                                          
2
 The tax related explanations for reversals is modeled on the ground that general tax law settings have limited 
abilities to recognize capital loss. If an investor incurs any capital loss in previous tax year, the amount of loss has a 
“carry-over” feature which can offset current or future capital gains. However, if an investor realizes capital gains, 
one would be immediately liable to pay capital gain taxes.   
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3.1 Standard contrarian performance hypothesis 
We begin our empirical investigation by considering the standard long term contrarian 
hypothesis. This hypothesis maintains that past performance can predict future returns. Winners 
and losers are defined as top and bottom 30% stocks according to their past 5-year performance, 
respectively. DeBondt and Thaler (1985) first find that losers with past low returns subsequently 
outperform winners with past high returns over next 3-5 years. This return reversal pattern can 
potentially generate a long term contrarian investment strategy from buying losers and selling 
winners. This strategy also suggests that the return spread (denoted as S0) between loser and 
winners should be significantly positive. This approach has been widely used in the literature to 
evaluate long term contrarian performance (George and Hwang, 2007; Ginblatt and Moskowitz, 
2004). Therefore, our first testable hypothesis is that:       
H1a: The return spread between loser and winner portfolios is significantly positive 
over a 5-year period. 
A large amount of empirical evidence across different countries shows that positive returns of 
losers drive the documented long term contrarian performance, for example, in the U.S. 
(DeBondt and Thaler, 1985 and Ginblatt and Moskowitz, 2004) and in the Japanese market 
(Chou et al., 2007). In line with previous studies, we thereby hypothesize that:     
H1b: Losers have significantly positive returns over a 5-year period.  
 
3.2 Price independence contrarian performance hypothesis 
If overall contrarian performance and loser performance is positive, it is worthwhile to 
investigate whether these phenomenon prevail in differently priced stocks or only in low-priced 
stocks. This is the key focus of the paper. Low-priced stocks are those with high transaction costs 
(Weld et al. 2009) which potentially make them sluggish to absorb new information. Lakonishok 
et al., (1992), Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Kumar and Lee (2006) find that low-priced 
stocks have low institutional ownerships and they are more preferable for individual investors. 
While institutional investors are traditionally viewed as inform traders, individuals are noise 
traders, suggesting that contrarian performance should be eliminated more quickly in high-priced 
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stocks than in low-priced stocks (Kaniel et al. 2008). Thus, these papers imply that contrarian 
performance can be price dependent and more pronounced in low-priced stock. Low-priced 
stocks are also small firms with a high bid-ask spread, which can largely bias returns (Conrad 
and Kaul, 1993 and Ball et al. 1995).  However, Loughran and Ritter (1996) find that after 
control for bid-ask spreads and survivorship bias contrarian performance still prevails in U.S. 
markets. In addition, Loughran and Ritter (1996) show that price alone has no prediction power 
for stock future returns. Liu (2006) contend that illiquid stocks identified by a composite 
measure of non trading days and turnover ratio may have higher returns for losers which drive 
long term contrarian performance. Given a positive relationship between liquidity and price 
(Weld et al. 2009), low-priced stocks also seem to have a higher liquidity risk which is a more 
likely contributor to contrarian performance. However, Wongchoti and Pyun (2005) find that 
contrarian performance survives in non S&P500 stocks only with high trading volume. This 
evidence can be hardly reconciled with general liquidity based explanations.           
DeBondt and Thaler (1985) attribute long term contrarian performance to investor overreaction 
to stock past performance. This view is challenged by Fama and French (1993; 1996) who argue 
that long term contrarian performance falls into the traditional risk-return paradigm. Since losers 
have a higher distress cost than winners, losers should earn a higher return. However, there is an 
intense debate on whether the value factor is a proxy for distress cost or for mispricing 
(Lakonishok et al. 1994 and Daniel and Titman, 1997), which reflects investors overreact to firm 
fundamentals such as earning announcements. We maintain that if long term contrarian 
performance is attributable to risk, such performance should completely disappear after risk 
adjustments. Otherwise, long term contrarian performance is more likely a mispricing effect.   
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
The difference between U.S. and U.K. markets also makes investigating low-priced stocks more 
relevant. Most of U.S. studies on return anomalies exclude stocks with price less than $5 (e.g. 
Jagadeesh and Titman, 2001 and Green and Hwang, 2009). Weld et al. (2009) find that U.S. 
stocks on average are constantly priced at $35 since the Great Depression, but not for other 
countries including U.K. Table 1 shows that the averaged stock price in U.K. is well below the 





. Mean (median) stock prices for high and low-priced stocks are £5.20 (5.16) and £0.36 
(0.33), respectively. Consistent with previous literature, low-priced stocks are small firms, 
generally low beta risk, and heavily characterized as value firms. The cross-sectional and time-
series mean value of BV/MV for low-priced stocks is 115%, which is substantially higher than 
middle-priced stocks with 1.07% and high-priced stocks with 0.68%. Since Fama and French 
(1993; 1996) interpret BV/MV as a proxy for distress cost, a high BV/MV ratio in low-priced 
stocks indicates that low-priced stocks might have a higher distress risk than the other two types 
of stocks. If contrarian performance is related to price and risk, it should be presumably stronger 
in low-priced stocks. However, if contrarian performance is a mispricing effect due to investor 
overreaction, it should be also observable in high- and middle-priced stocks.   
In summary, we maintain two competing hypotheses.  
H2a: Contrarian performance prevails in high-, middle-, and low-priced stocks over the 
long term.  
H2b: Contrarian performance exists only in low-priced stocks over the long term.  
To investigate H2a and H2b, we rank all sample stocks according to their prices by a cut-off rate 
of 30% for example the top 30%, the middle 40% and the bottom 30% of stocks, in a given 
month. Thus, six priced level based contrarian portfolios are constructed upon three price 
portfolios interacting with winner and loser portfolios. For a given price level (e.g. high, middle, 
low), there are price level based loser and winner portfolios and their return difference as our 
measurement for contrarian performance (S). We denote S1, S2 and S3 for the contrarian 
performance at the high, middle and low price level, respectively. Finally, we also evaluate 
individual returns for the six price level based contrarian portfolios to identify the main source of 
contrarian performance.      
4. Sample, Variable Definitions and Methodology 
4.1.  Sample 
                                                          
3
 At the time of writing, 1£ is approximately equal to 1.6 US$.  
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The sample of stocks is based on the constituents of the FTSE-All Share Index from January 
1970 to December 2009 and the constituents of FTSE-All Small Index from January 2000 to 
December 2009
4
. The monthly price, return series and market capitalisation of each stock are 
extracted from the Thomson Reuters Datastream. We include only UK stocks which are quoted 
in the British Sterling on the LSE. We exclude unit trusts, close-end, and open-end funds in the 
sample. Our sample dataset contains 1745 sample stocks and 462,263 firm-month observations. 
To control sample selection bias, we set dead firms’ the last trading month return as -100% and 
as missing values in the following months. This coding rule reflects the UK firm insolvency 
process in which stocks of such firms become worthless (Liu, 2008; Taffler et al. 2004; Franks et 
al., 1996
5
). We denote the price on the last trading day of month t as Pt, and its monthly price 
history as Pt-1, Pt-2…, Pt-60. In this paper, we use past 5-year return to sort sample stocks in a 
given month t . A stock at least has a series of 24 monthly returns to be included in the sample
6
. 
The dataset is unbalanced in each calendar month, meaning that the number of observations 
varies when we run calendar time based Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions. With a 60-month 
test period, the first cross-sectional regression starts from January 1975, while the last regression 
ends in December 2009. There are 526 stocks in January 1975 and 1073 stocks in December 
2009. 
4.2 Variables 
                                                          
4
 The FTSE All Small Index is a family index of the FTSE Small Cap Index, the FTSE Fledging Index and the FTSE 
All Small Sector Indices. The constituent list of the FTSE All Small Index provided by the Datastream starts from 
January 2000. While the FTSE All Share Index represents approximately 98% of the UK’s market capitalizations, 
the remaining 2% of captialisations is captured by the FTSE All Small Index.   
5
 According to Franks et al., (1996), Chapter 11 in the U.S. insolvency code allows the debtor to retain control of 
bankrupted firms, while in the UK receivership gives control rights to a particular secured creditor, who has no duty 
to take account of the interests of other junior creditors. Therefore, UK investors are unlikely to get any residual 
assets from bankrupted firms.  
6
 If a stock has a monthly return series less than 60 and greater or equal to 24, the stock is held in the benchmark 
portfolio, which is neither a winner nor a loser portfolio, until its last trading month. We are grateful for an 
anonymous referee for making this suggestion. 
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(i) Past performance measure (5-year winner or loser): this measure is simply the stock’s return 









( )60...3,2,1j . The subscript j is the number 
of rolling back windows. The subscript t denotes month t. Both 5-year winner and 5-year loser 
are dummy variables. If a stock is ranked in the top (bottom) 30% of all stocks in terms of past 5-
year return, 5-year winner (5-year loser) is equal to 1 and 0 otherwise at a given month t-j.  
(ii) Six price level based contrarian portfolios: HP_Winner, MP_Winner, LP_Winner, HP_ Loser, 
MP_Loser, and LP_Loser. We use two sorts, past 5-year return and price levels, to build six 
price level based contrarian portfolios. We rank all sample stock prices in each month at a high, 
middle, low price level by a 30% cut-off rate. HP, MP and LP stand for stock price in the top 
30%, middle 40%, and bottom 30% of all sample stocks. Then, we intersect price levels with 
past performance to formulate six dummy variables, which represent six portfolios. For example, 
HP_Winner is a dummy variable. It equals to one if a stock is in the top 30% past performance 
group and also at the top 30% of all sample stock prices, and zero otherwise. The remaining five 
dummies are constructed in a same manner.  
(iii) Momentum controls (the 52 Week high price):  To control for the momentum effect, we use 
dummies of 52wkhWi,t-j and 52wkhLi,t-j which are the highest and lowest price levels in the 52 










ranked among the top (bottom) 30% of all stocks in month t-j, and zero otherwise. Here, Pi,t-j is 
the price stock i at the end of month t-j and highi,t-j  is the highest month-end price of stock i 
during the 12-month period that ends on the last day of the month t-j . George and Hwang (2004) 
find the 52-week high measure is more able to capture short-term momentum than the past 
performance measure based on the fixed (e.g. 6-month returns) window used by Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993)
7
. Furthermore, George and Hwang claim that the 52-week high measure is not 
subject to long-term reversals. 
                                                          
7
 In addition, George and Hwang (2004) find that the 52-week high measure is superior to Moskowitz and Grinblatt 
(1999) who argue that momentum in individual stock returns is driven by momentum in industry returns.   
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4.3 Empirical model  
Following George and Hwang (2004, 2007) and Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004), we use the 
Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions to estimate abnormal returns for each portfolio. If an 
investor forms portfolios of winners and losers every month and hold these portfolios for the 
next T months, the return earned in a given month t is the equal-weighted average of the returns 
to T portfolios, each formed in one of the past T months t-j (for j=1,...,T and T=1,.. 60). The 
denotation j is a subscript of the number of rolling back months. The contribution of the portfolio 
formed in month t-j to the month t return can be obtained by estimating the following cross-













              (1) 
where Rit is the return to stock i in month t. Sizei,t-1 is market capitalisation in a logarithm form 
for stock i and at month t-1. Ri,t-1 is stock i’s return at month t-1 . Both Sizei,t-1 and  Ri,t-1  are 
included in the regression as deviations from cross sectional means at month t-1. The intercept 
b0jt is the risk neutral portfolio’s return which has been taken out by the effects of average size, 
bid-ask bounce, and momentum. We run this regression 60 times (j=1,2,…60) for each calendar 
month t from January 1975 to December 2009.  The sum of jtb0 + jtb5  is the month-t return to a 
portfolio formed in month t-j that is long in winner stocks. Consequently, jtb5 can be viewed as 
an average return in excess of jtb0  by taking a long position in winners j months ago. The 
coefficient difference between  jtb6  and jtb5  in Eq(1) is an average contrarian performance 
generated by taking a long position in losers and a short position in winners. Given our prior in 
the standard contrarian hypothesis (H1a and H1b), we expect ( jtb6  - jtb5 ) to be positive.  The 






bS .Then, the time series mean, 
5S , is an excess return for past winners 
relative to stocks which are neither winners nor losers.  The coefficients on other variables can 
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be computed and interpreted in a same way. The time series means (
5S ) of the month-by-month 
estimates and their t-statistics are reported in the tables.  
We extend our model in Eq (1) to compare returns for six price level based portfolios on a head 
















Each coefficient on the six portfolios is a return relative to stocks which are neither 5-year 
winners nor 5-year losers. Therefore, we implicitly set stocks that have not experienced extreme 
price changes over a 5-year period as a benchmark group. The coefficient difference ( 58 bb  ) is 
the contrarian performance at the high price level denoting as S1. ( 69 bb  ) is the contrarian 
performance at the middle price level defined as S2. Finally, ( 710 bb  ) is the contrarian 
performance at the low price level defines as S3. According to H2a, we expect that S1, S2, and 
S3 are jointly positive.  For H2b, we expect that only S3 is significantly positive.  
Risk-adjusted abnormal returns for each portfolio in Eq (1) and (2) are obtained by using the 
Fama-French (1993) three-factor model
8
  and the liquid augmented CAPM model
9
 (Liu, 2006) 
                                                          
8
 The book to mark ratio reported in the Datastream starts from June 1979. Our risk-adjusted returns are 
correspondently calculated from July 1979 to December 2009.   
9
 The Liu’s (2006) liquidity augmented CAPM model  is 
itifmiii
eLIQsRRbaR  )( . LIQ is a liquidity 
factor, which is measured by the return difference between low liquid stocks and high liquid stocks according LM12 
in month t. We use a 30% cutoff rate to sort LM12 in a given month. The top 30% of stocks in terms of LM12 is low 















 ). 12-month 
turnover is turnover over the prior 12 months, calculated as the sum of daily turnover over the prior 12 months. 
Daily turnover is the ratio of the number of shares traded on a day to the number of shares outstanding at the end of 
the day. NoTD is the total number of trading days in the market over the prior 12 months. The value of 11,000 is 
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over the holding period. For example, in Eq(1) the time series of tS5  is individually regressed on 
the Fama-French (1993) three factors. The intercept (alpha) of the regressions is risk-adjusted 
abnormal returns for 5-year winner portfolio. In addition, we also regress ( 710 bb  ) on the Fama-
French (1993) three factors to obtain risk-adjusted contrarian performance at the low price level. 
We apply the liquidity augment CAPM model (Liu, 2006) in a same way as the Fama-French 
three factor model to obtain risk adjusted returns. While there are two portfolios and one spread 
of contrarian performance in Eq (1), Eq (2) can generate returns of six portfolios and three 
spreads. To examine the joint significance of returns on relevant portfolios, we employ the GRS 
test developed by Gibbons et al. (1989) with the null hypothesis that risk-adjusted returns on the 
portfolios are jointly equal to zero
10
. More specifically, the GRS test evaluates the joint 
significance of the two portfolios’ returns, which are obtained from Eq(1). It also tests the joint 
significance of the three spreads and six portfolios’ returns, which are obtained from Eq (2).    
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Summary statistics 
Table 2 reports summary statistics for winner and loser portfolios. Panel A is for the whole 
sample period, while Panel B and Panel C are for January 1975 to December 1991 and for 
January 1992 to December 2009, respectively.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Given a 30% cut-off rate of past 5-year performance, 5-year winner and loser portfolio on 
average include 213 and 214 stocks in each month (column (1)). Across price levels, low-priced 
stocks account for 13% and 58% in 5-year winner and loser portfolios, respectively (column 2). 
The equivalent percentages of high-priced stocks are 49% and 11%, and 38% and 31% for 
middle-priced stocks. This evidence shows that high-priced stocks constitute the largest number 
                                                                                                                                                                                           







for all sample stocks. We obtain the liquid premium from the 
low liquid portfolio and the high liquid portfolio on a monthly basis starting from October 1986. 
10
 The GRS test is basically a F-statistics test on risk-adjusted returns of portfolios. Fama and French (2006) also use 
the GRS test to evaluate whether the value premium varies with firm size.  
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of stocks in 5-year winner portfolios, while low-priced stocks dominate 5-year loser portfolios. 
The figures reported from columns (3) to (7) are monthly averages of cross-sectional means in 
each month over 420 months from January 1975
11
 to December 2009. Averaged returns over 
past five years are 323% for winners and -31% for losers (Column 3). The average price of 5-
year winner portfolio is £3.75 and £1.06 for 5-year loser (Column 4). For a given price level, 
averaged prices of winners are consistently higher than those of losers, e.g. high-priced winners 
(£6.18) > high-priced losers (£4.52). Column (6) reports relative prices to stocks’ 5-year highs. 
This measure indicates how far a stock’s current price is away from its 5-year highest price. 
While 5-year winners are closer to their 5-year highs (-26%), 5-year losers are at -56% below 
their 5-year highs on average. Consistent with the past 5-year performance measure (column (3)), 
low priced losers and high priced winners are extreme losers and winners in terms of their 5-year 
highs (-63% against -20%), respectively. In column (7), we find that 5-year winners are large 
stocks (£1,129m) whereas 5-year losers are small stocks (£316m). However, when we compare 
firm size across price levels we find that high price winners (£1,887m) are a similar size to high-
price losers (£1,794m), and middle-price losers (£428m) are slightly larger than middle-priced 
winners (£374m). Both low priced winners (£56m) and losers (£43m) are small firms of a similar 
size.   
Panel B and Panel C separate the whole sample period into two sub-periods. Comparing the 
number of stocks in column (1) for each sub-period, in the latter period the average number of 
stocks has increased. The number of stocks in 5-year winner portfolio increases from 164 to 258 
whereas for losers from 165 to 259. Consequently, the weights of high-priced 5-year winners and 
low priced losers increase from 42% to 53% and from 50% to 64%, respectively, between the 
two sub periods. In column (3), we find that past 5-year returns of 5-year winners and losers 
have been reduced in half in the latter period. However, firm size of both 5-year winners and 5-
year losers has increased in the latter period. Finally, consistent with the evidence in the whole 
sample period, middle priced losers are larger than middle priced winners in two sub-periods.  
5.2.   Standard contrarian performance hypothesis 
                                                          
11
 The first month for the 5-year performance measure is available from January 1975 onwards, because the dataset 
starts from January 1970.    
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We first estimate Eq (1) to test the standard contrarian-hypothesis H1a and H1b. Table 3 reports 
the results for five individual annual holding periods (column (1) to (10)) and for a five-year 
period (column (11) and (12)). We report results including all calendar months and excluding 
both January and April in each observation window. This approach reflects the tax settings in 
which the UK personal tax year ends in April. George and Hwang (2007) and Ginblatt and 
Moskowitz (2004) contend that return reversals are influenced by tax year ends. The last row of 
Table 3 reports the average number of stocks to run cross-sectional regressions in each calendar 
month.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
The key variables of interest reported in Table 3 are 5-year winner and 5-year loser. Consistent 
with our hypothesis (H1b), 5-year losers earn a significantly positive return of 0.17% per month 
with t-statistic 2.98 over a 5-year period. Excluding both January and April, 5-year losers have a 
return of 0.14 % with t-statistic 2.43. However, 5-year winners have an insignificantly negative 
return of -0.04% per month over a 5-year period. Returns for 5-year losers in the first four 
holding periods from columns (1) to (8) are significantly positive (except for column (2)) 
regardless of the two calendar months of January and April. Returns of winners outside January 
and April are generally smaller than those including the two calendar months. One typical 
example is in the second holding period (column (3) and (4)). Including all calendar months, 
winners earn an insignificant return of -0.09% per month, while outside January and April they 
have a significant return of -0.11% per month. This evidence suggests that the January-April 
effect appears to magnify winner reversals. However, loser returns outside January and April are 
generally equal or greater than those including all calendar months. For example, in the first year 
holding period (column (1) and (2), loser returns become insignificantly positive outside January 
and April, implying that  the calendar effect mitigates loser return reversals.  
At the bottom of Table 3, we report results of contrarian performance measured by the spread 
between buying 5-year losers and selling 5-year winners (S0). In a 5-year period (column (12)), 
5-year losers outperform 5-year winners by 0.20% per month after controlling for January and 
April. In each sub-period window, the spread is significantly positive in windows (13, 24), (25, 
36) and (37, 48). Overall, consistent with the hypothesis H1a, the evidence here supports the 
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existence of long term contrarian performance on the LSE. Comparing our results with those in 
U.S. studies, the magnitude of reversals (0.20% per month) is similar to the finding of Jegadeesh 
and Titman (2001) (e.g. 0.29% per month).  However, 0.20% per month is smaller than, the 
finding of DeBondt and Thaler (1985) 0.51% per month. The large difference of magnitude in 
the two countries may be attributable to a more extreme cut-off rate used by DeBondt and Thaler 
(1985), as they include only the top and bottom 50 NYSE stocks against ours the top and bottom 
30% of all sample stocks in terms of past performance.           
The remaining variables in Table 3 are controls for short-term anomalies in the cross-sectional 
regressions: momentum variable (52wkh winner and 52wkh loser), microstructure effects ( 1, tiR ), 
and size ( )1, tisize . For the first holding period (1, 12) the average return on momentum winners 
(52wkh winner) is significantly positive at 0.22% per month while it is -0.78% per month for 
momentum losers (52wkh loser). In the (1, 60) holding period momentum winners and losers 
earn significant returns of 0.06% and -0.19%, respectively. Consistent with the findings of 
George and Hwang (2004), momentum winners and losers do not reverse their returns in the long 
term. Our proxy to control for microstructure effects ( 1, tiR ) is significantly negatively correlated 
with monthly returns when we include all calendar months. However, when we exclude January 
and April, the coefficient becomes weakly significant or insignificant. The findings of negative 
autocorrelations between current and previous month return is generally consistent with the 
finding of Jegadeesh and Titman (1995). Finally, the estimate of 1, tisize  is insignificantly 
different from zero in the cross-sectional regressions.  
5.3   The price-independence contrarian performance hypothesis 
In this section, we further formulate price level based winner and loser portfolios to examine 
whether contrarian performance is different at each price level. There are three winner portfolios: 
high-priced (HP_winner), middle-priced (MP_winner) and low-priced (LP_winner), and 
similarly three loser portfolios.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
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The results are reported in Table 4. Over a 5-year period low priced winners experience 
significantly negative return of -0.18% (t-statistic -1.76) for all calendar months and -0.24% (t-
statistic -2.22) per month outside January and April (Columns (11) and (12)); Irrespective of 
April and January, returns for both middle priced and high priced winners are insignificant in the 
5-year holding period and across the five sub periods. In contrast, low-priced winners have 
significantly negative returns in four out of the five holding periods: including (13, 24), (25, 36), 
(37, 48) and (49, 60). In these four holding periods when April and January are excluded the 
returns are still significantly negative, and consistently more negative, than the results for all 
calendar months. For example, the monthly return in the holding period (13, 24) falls from -
0.18% to -0.27%. It therefore appears that low priced stocks play an important role in winner 
reversals after accounting for the January-April effect.  
Among losers, only middle-priced losers earn a significant return of 0.20% over a 5-year period 
(column (11)). When April and January are excluded the return of middle-priced losers is 0.16 % 
per month. Both of the returns of middle-priced losers are statistically significant at less than 1% 
level. Across sub-period windows, middle priced losers start to have a positive return from the 
first year (1, 12) (column (1)) and this trend ends in the fourth year (column (7)). Returns for 
middle priced losers are slightly reduced when excluding January and April. This evidence is 
consistent across sub periods and over a 5-year period. For example, in column (7) and (8), a 
positive return 0.17% per month becomes insignificant at 0.10% outside January and April. For 
the other two loser portfolios, high-priced and low-priced losers have no significant return over a 
5-year period (column (11) and (12)). In each sub-period window, low-priced losers have weakly 
significant returns in the second (13, 24) and the third (25, 26) period at 0.16% per month and 
0.15% per month, respectively. High-priced losers have significant returns only in the fourth and 
fifth period at 0.33% and 0.26% per month, respectively. In sum, these results show that over a 
5-year period middle-priced losers are mainly responsible for losers’ contrarian performance.     
The three spreads are reported in Panel B.  The first spread S1 is for the high-price (HP_loser 
minus HP_winner), the second spread S2 is for the middle-price (MP_loser minus MP_winner), 
and S3 captures the low-price level (LP_loser minus LP_winner). All three spreads are 
significantly positive at 0.17% (t-statistic 1.68), 0.21% (t-statistic 2.91), and 0.26 (t-statistic 2.32) 
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for all calendar months over a 5-year period. Excluding April and January they are 0.17% (t-
statistic 1.41), 0.22% (t-statistic 2.78), and 0.29% (t-statistic 2.34) for S1, S2, and S3, 
respectively. We also undertake three pair-wise mean tests between S1, S2, and S3 for the 60-
month return to examine whether contrarian performance differs across three price levels. None 
of test statistics is significant, suggesting that contrarian performance between losers and winners 
at each price level is insignificantly different to each other. Consistent with our hypothesis H2a, 
contrarian performance is less likely dependent on stock price. Inconsistent with H2b, contrarian 
performance is not fully generated from low-priced stocks.  
5.4 Fama-French Risk-adjusted Returns  
In this section, we investigate whether contrarian performance can be maintained after the Fama-
French (FF) (1993) risk adjustments. Panel A in Table 5 reports risk-adjusted returns for overall 
5-year winners and losers. Panel B shows returns for six price-based winner and loser portfolios. 
Panel C reports three spreads (S1, S2, and S3) based on price levels.    
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Columns (11) and (12) in Panel A show that risk-adjusted returns for 5-year winners are 
insignificant over a 5-year period, while 5-year losers have a significantly positive return of 
0.15% per month in all calendar months and 0.13% per month outside January and April. The 
GRS test in column (11) and (12) rejects the null hypothesis that returns for 5-year winners and 
losers
12
 are jointly equal to zero at less than 1% level.  Across sub-periods, 5-year winners only 
have a significant return of -0.10% in one observation window (e.g. the fifth year (49, 60)) 
outside January and April in column (10)).  However, risk-adjusted returns for 5-year losers are 
still significant in observation windows from (13, 24) to (49, 60) (except column (4)) in which 
the GRS test rejects the null hypothesis of joint zero returns for 5-year winners and losers at less 
than 5% level. Risk-adjusted contrarian performance between 5-year winners and losers (S0) is 
                                                          
12
 In unreported results, 5-year winners have significantly negative loadings on the size and value factor and a 
significantly positive loading on the market factor, implying that 5-year winners are large, growth and high market 
risk stocks. 5-year losers only have a significantly positive loading on the value factor and insignificantly loadings 
on the market and size factor, suggesting that 5-year losers are value stocks. These results are available upon request 
from authors.  
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significantly positive from the second to the fifth year and also over a 5-year period (column (11) 
and (12)). The overall contrarian performance is mainly driven by 5-year losers across each 
observation window except for column (10).  Our results reveal that on a FF risk adjusted basis, 
the positive performance of losers still persists, and thereby support H1a   and H1b. 
Panel B shows risk-adjusted returns for six price level based contrarian portfolios. None of 
winner portfolios at three price levels has significant contrarian performance either over a 5-year 
period or in each sub period except for middle-priced winners in column (10) and high-priced 
winner in column (3). However, middle- and low-priced losers have significant returns of 0.17% 
per month and 0.15% per month, respectively, at less than 5% level.  Furthermore, the GRS test 
in column (11) and (12) rejects the null hypothesis that the six portfolios jointly have an equal 
zero return with p-values of 0.01 and 0.02, respectively. Comparing with our cross-sectional 
analysis in Table 4, the FF model fully explains away negative returns of low-priced winners, 
while positive returns of middle- and low-priced losers persist. These results imply that the FF 
model is more powerful in explaining winners’ contrarian performance than losers’. The 
January-April effect is not as strong as those in the cross-sectional analysis. For example, outside 
January and April low-priced losers have a return of 0.18% per month, which is slightly higher 
than 0.15% per month including all calendar months.   
Column (11) in Panel C reveals that over a 5-year period only is S2 significantly positive at 
0.15% per month outside January and April. Once again, the GRS test in column (11) and (12) 
rejects the null hypothesis that S1, S2 and S3 are jointly equal to zero with p-values of 0.03 and 
0.04, respectively. This result suggests that contrarian performance prevails in middle-priced 
stocks. Across each sub period, the GRS test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the three 
spreads are jointly equal to zero in the first two periods (column (1) to (4)).  
Our analysis based on the FF framework reveals that middle-priced losers are potentially 
responsible for the overall contrarian performance on the UK market. The result is inconsistent 
with the hypothesis (H2b) that contrarian performance should persist only in low-priced stocks.   
5.5 Liquidity Augmented CAPM adjusted returns 
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Our main findings in previous section show that contrarian performance is driven by low-priced 
and middle-priced stocks and thereby, it is interesting to see whether contrarian performance 
from those stocks can survive after adjusting the liquidity risk. Liu (2006) contends that 
contrarian performance is potentially driven by a high liquidity risk in loser stocks.  We therefore 
investigate whether our previous findings are robust with respect to the Liu’s (2006) liquidit-
augmented CAPM model
13
. Our findings from this analysis are reported in Table 6 for the 
sample period of October 1986 to December 2009 (279 months), since the trading volume data in 
Datastream starts from October 1985.      
[Insert Table 6 here] 
In a 5-year period (column (11) in Panel A), 5-year losers have a significantly positive return of 
0.14% per month at less than 5% level, while the average return for 5-year winners is  
insignificantly negative. When we exclude returns in January and April (column (12)), 5-year 
losers still maintain a positive return of 0.13%. In addition, the GRS test in column (11) and (12) 
rejects the null hypothesis that returns on the two portfolios jointly equal to zero. These results 
are generally consistent with those in the FF model. In each sub-period, there are 7 observation 
windows with significant returns for 5-year losers, while in Table 5 (FF) the number is 6.  S0 in 
Table 6 shows that losers outperform winners by 0.18% per month over a 5-year period (column 
11) and 0.19% outside January and April. Therefore, risk adjusted overall contrarian 
performance by the Liu’s model provides similar results to that from the FF model. Once again, 
these results are consistent with our hypotheses H1a   and H1b. 
Column (11) in Panel B reveals that among the six price level based contrarian portfolios, only 
middle-priced losers have a significantly positive return of 0.16% per month in all calendar 
months and 0.14% outside January and April over a 5-year period. In each sub-period, middle-
priced losers maintain significant returns from the second year (e.g. 0.19% per month in column 
(3)) until the fifth year. From column (3), the GRS test rejects the null hypothesis that the six 
portfolios have jointly equal return to zero at less than 5% level. Neither low-priced winners nor 
low-priced losers have significant returns over a 5-year period regardless of January and April. 
                                                          
13
 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for making this suggestion.    
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This result contrasts with the finding of significantly positive returns of low-priced losers in 
Table 5, suggesting that the liquidity augmented CAPM model (Liu, 2006) is more able to 
explain contrarian performance of low-priced stocks than the FF model. Among the three spreads, 
only S2 remains significantly positive over a 5-year period (column (11)) and outside April and 
January.  The only difference between the two risk-adjusted frameworks is that the GRS test 
statistic for the three spreads outside January and April is significant at a 9% level in Panel C 
column (12) Table 6.   
Overall, this analysis shows that the significant positive performance of low-priced losers can be 
explained by the liquidity augmented CAPM model (Liu, 2006). However, positive returns of 
middle-priced losers persist after we control for liquidity and market risk. Therefore, middle-
priced losers
14
 are more likely to be the main driving force for contrarian performance. In FF 
factor loadings for the 60-month return, both middle-priced and low-priced losers
15
 have 
significantly positive loadings on the value factor, suggesting that both of them have a strong 
value feature. However, the impact of the value feature in middle-priced losers is largely offset 
by impacts of the size and the market factor (both of their loadings are significantly negative). 
This evidence possibly implies that the value factor has limited power in explaining contrarian 
performance of middle-priced stocks. Also, the liquidity factor loading of the 60-month return 
for low-priced losers is significantly positive, while middle-priced losers have an insignificantly 
negative loading on the liquidity factor, implying that middle-priced losers are as liquid as the 
risk-neutral benchmark portfolio. These results are consistent with the theoretical prediction of 
value investing (Barberis and Shliefer, 2003) that investors are more likely to choose liquid value 
stocks rather than illiquid value stocks to exploit contrarian performance.   
 6.  Conclusions 
This paper investigates whether long-term contrarian performance is driven by low-priced stocks 
on the LSE from 1970 to 2009. Low-priced stocks have unique characteristics relative to middle- 
                                                          
14
 Although our results show that middle-priced losers have significant returns on a risk-adjusted basis, the 
magnitude of this return (e.g. 0.17% per month) may reflect a part of the averaged bid-ask spread in middle-priced 
stocks. 
15
 These results are available upon request.  
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and high-priced stocks: they are smaller, have higher book to market equity ratios, and have 
higher liquidity risk. These attributes of low-priced stocks have long been argued to explain the 
long term return anomaly of losers outperforming winners. The LSE is dominated by many small 
and low-priced stocks, thereby making it more relevant to investigate whether contrarian 
performance is clustered only in low-priced stocks on the LSE.  This paper also contributes to the 
debate on contrarian performance whether it is a mispricing effect or a reflection of the risk-
return paradigm.    
In both the cross-sectional and the time-series analysis, we find that 5-year losers outperform 5-
year winners over the long term. Overall contrarian performance is mainly driven by positive 
loser returns. This result supports the standard contrarian performance hypothesis and is also 
consistent with the previous literature. To break down contrarian performance at each price level, 
we construct six portfolios which are paired with past performance and three price levels. In the 
cross-section analysis, we find that contrarian performance at the high, middle, and low price 
level are all positive. When we use the Fama-French (1996) three-factor model to obtain risk-
adjusted returns, we find that middle-priced and low-priced losers have significantly positive 
returns. This evidence reveals that contrarian performance is not clustered only in low-priced 
stocks. Finally, we employ the liquidity augmented CAPM model (Liu, 2006) to examine 
whether positive returns of losers compensate investors for bearing a higher liquidity risk. We 
find that after controlling for market and liquidity risk positive returns of low-priced losers 
disappear. This evidence is consistent with the Liu’s argument for contrarian performance. In 
contrast, contrarian performance at the middle price level and positive returns of middle-priced 
losers persist, suggesting that middle-priced losers are potentially the main driving force for 
contrarian performance in the UK market. This result further confirms that low-priced stocks are 
not responsible for long term contrarian performance on a risk adjusted basis.   
In conclusion, our findings suggest that long term contrarian performance is less likely a 
reflection of the risk-return paradigm. Both the Fama-French (1993) and the liquidity augmented 
CAPM (Liu, 2006) model cannot fully explain contrarian performance. Our results are more 
consistent with the overreaction hypothesis (DeBondt and Thaler 1985). This investor irrational 
behaviour may generate the predictability of past performance for future stock return. The 
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evidence of contrarian performance of middle-priced stocks may also be line with the theoretical 
model of style investing (Barberis and Shliefer, 2003), suggesting that as a value investing style 
investors are more likely to choose liquid value stocks rather than illiquid value stocks to exploit 
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Table 1 Overall stock characteristic on the London Stock Exchange 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
stocks Price (£) Size(£1 million) β BV/MV (%)
High-priced stocks 5.20 (5.16) 1869.88 (1316.08) 0.96(0.95) 0.68 (0.54)
Middle-priced stocks 1.44 (1.49) 369.56 (295.41) 0.89(0.88) 1.07(0.96)
Low-priced stocks 0.36 (0.33) 39.92 (38.35) 0.82(0.78) 115 (82)  
Note: The dataset is from July 1979 to December 2009, including constituent stocks of the FTSE All-Share Index 
and the FTSE All-Small Index in the London Stock Exchange (LSE). All sample stocks are sorted by their prices in 
each month. The top 30% of stocks in terms of price is defined as high-priced stocks, while the bottom 30% of 
stocks is defined as low-priced stocks. The middle 40% of stocks is defined as middle-priced stocks. Price is in unit 
of British pound.  Size is total market value in millions. BV/MV is the ratio of book value equity to market value 
equity. The numbers in column (1), (2) and (4) are the time-series average of cross-section averages in each month. 
The numbers in bracket in column (1), (2) and (4) are median values of time-series averages for each portfolio.  β is 
the market risk. We estimate each portfolio’s β in each month from past 60-month return observations. The numbers 
in column (3) are the time-series average of β values for each portfolio. The numbers in bracket in column (3) are 
median values of time-series β values for each portfolio.   
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics 














5-year winner 213 100% 323% 3.75 5.73 -26% 1129
HP Winner 105 49% 341% 6.18 8.73 -20% 1887
MP winner 81 38% 321% 1.66 3.33 -31% 374
LP winner 27 13% 270% 0.48 1.21 -34% 56
5-year loser 214 100% -31% 1.06 2.96 -56% 316
HP Loser 24 11% -13% 4.52 8.55 -39% 1794
MP Loser 66 31% -22% 1.37 3.90 -50% 428
LP Loser 124 58% -40% 0.34 1.65 -63% 43
5-year winner 164 100% 411% 2.47 3.91 -29% 242
HP Winner 69 42% 427% 4.40 6.30 -21% 157
MP winner 69 42% 421% 1.34 2.67 -33% 102
LP winner 27 16% 343% 0.49 1.14 -37% 28
5-year loser 165 100% 0% 1.26 2.41 -44% 182
HP Loser 27 16% 16% 3.82 6.09 -30% 270
MP Loser 57 34% 7% 1.25 2.52 -40% 177
LP Loser 82 50% -10% 0.37 1.08 -52% 31
5-year winner 258 100% 242% 4.93 7.41 -23% 1942
HP Winner 138 53% 261% 7.81 10.96 -19% 3200
MP winner 93 36% 229% 1.93 3.94 -29% 623
LP winner 27 11% 203% 0.47 1.27 -31% 82
5-year loser 259 100% -59% 0.88 3.46 -67% 439
HP Loser 22 9% -40% 5.17 10.83 -47% 3109
MP Loser 74 28% -49% 1.48 5.17 -59% 658
LP Loser 164 64% -66% 0.30 2.17 -73% 56
Panel A: the whole sample period from January 1975 to December 2009
Panel B: the sub sample period from January 1975 to December 1991
Panel C: the sub sample period from January 1992 to December 2009
The dataset is from January 1970 to December 2009, including constituent stocks of the FTSE All-Share Index and 
the FTSE All-Small Index in the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The statistics are the time-series averages of cross-
sectional means in each month. No. of stocks (column 1) is the average number of stocks in each portfolio across 
each calendar month from January 1975 to December 2009. Percentage (column 2) is the weight of stocks in price 
level based contrarian portfolio to stocks in related contrarian portfolio, e.g. winners or losers. Past 5-year return 









) (in percentage) in each month t. tP  is month t’s price and 60tP  is the past 
60-month price, which is ends at t. Price (column 4) is quoted in the British Pence at the end of each month. 5-year 
high price (column 5) is the highest month end price during past 5 years which end at month t. The mean price 







). Market capitalisation (column 7) is measured 









) in the 
top (bottom) 30% of all stocks during past 60-month at month t.  HP, MP, and LP are defined as price at the three 
levels, the top 30%, middle 40%, and bottom 30% of all stocks, in month t, respectively. HP winner (loser), MP 
winner (loser), and LP winner (loser) are intersections between past 5-year performance and price levels. 
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Table 3 Performance of overall 5-year winner and loser 
















































Intercept 1.21 1.03 0.95 0.72 0.89 0.62 0.93 0.70 0.96 0.72 1.01 0.87
(3.81) (1.98) (2.87) (2.01) (3.01) (1.86) (3.51) (1.78) (3.06) (1.91) (4.56) (2.01)
R i,t-1 -1.35 -1.24 -1.11 -0.84 -0.92 -0.61 -1.23 -0.67 -1.13 -0.77 -1.08 -0.98
(-3.01) (-1.54) (-2.38) (-1.46) (-2.25) (-1.89) (-2.28) (-1.82) (-2.45) (-1.49) (-2.13) (-1.63)
Size i, t-1 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03
(-0.53) (-0.85) (0.41) (0.74) (0.83) (1.23) (0.36) (0.89) (0.82) (1.04) (0.55) (0.79)
52wkh Winner 0.22 0.31 0.04 0.11 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.11
(3.86) (5.82) (0.98) (2.73) (0.58) (1.31) (0.26) (1.74) (-0.37) (-0.42) (1.97) (3.53)
52wkh Loser -0.78 -0.95 -0.16 -0.29 -0.03 -0.12 0.01 -0.02 0.05 0.03 -0.17 -0.27
(-8.29) (-9.28) (-2.50) (-4.42) (-0.68) (-1.82) (0.25) (-0.42) (1.27) (0.58) (-4.35) (-6.48)
5-year Winner -0.05 -0.04 -0.09 -0.11 -0.05 -0.07 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06
(-1.00) (-0.78) (-1.51) (-2.00) (-0.82) (-1.32) (0.17) (-0.47) (-0.36) (-0.54) (-0.92) (-1.30)
5-year Loser 0.10 0.05 0.21 0.18 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.09 0.09 0.17 0.14
(1.80) (1.32) (3.02) (2.46) (3.17) (2.64) (2.75) (2.53) (0.97) (1.35) (2.98) (2.43)
Contrarian 0.15 0.07 0.30 0.29 0.26 0.29 0.18 0.23 0.09 0.13 0.21 0.20
Performance(S0) (1.74) (1.43) (3.17) (2.98) (2.98) (3.20) (2.24) (2.82) (0.97) (1.70) (3.15) (2.87)
Avg. obs 827 827 793 793 761 761 730 730 715 715 763 763  
We estimate the following cross-sectional regression on a monthly basis between January 1975 and December 2009, )60...2,1(60 j           
ijtjtijtjtijtjtijtjtijttijttijtjtit eyearLoserbyearWinnerbwkhLoserbwkhWinnerbsizebRbbR   ,6,5,4,31,21,10 555252  
itR is the return to stock i in month t .  1itR and 1, tisize are the return and natural logarithm of market capitalisation of stock i in month 1t net of the month 1t cross-sectional 
mean and )52(52 ,, jtijti wkhLoserwkhWinner   is the 52 week high winner (loser) dummy that takes the value of one if the 52-week high measure for stock i is ranked in the top (bottom) 
30%  in month jt  , and zero otherwise. The 52-week high measure in month jt  is the ratio of the price level in month jt  to the maximum price achieved in months 12 jt  
to jt  . 5-year winner (5-year loser) are defined as performance ( 60 60( ) /t j t j t jP P P     ) in the top (bottom) 30% of all stocks during past 60 months at month t-j.  Contrarian 
performance is measured by buying 5-year losers and selling 5-year winners (e.g. 6 5b b  ) in month jt  . The coefficient estimates of a given independent variable are averaged 
over 12,...2,1j for column labelled (1, 12), 24,...14,13j for columns labelled (13, 24),…, 60,...2,1j for columns labelled (1,60). The numbers reported in the table are the time-
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series of averages of these averages in percent per month. Average observations for each calendar month based on cross-sectional regressions are reported in the last row. The 
accompanying t-statistics are calculated from the time series.  
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Table 4 Price-level based winners and losers 
















































HP_Winner 0.00 0.10 -0.12 -0.13 -0.05 -0.04 0.06 0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.00
(0.06) (1.33) (-1.69) (-1.68) (-0.68) (-0.39) (0.87) (0.55) (-0.01) (-0.57) (-0.58) (-0.15)
MP_Winner -0.06 -0.09 -0.03 -0.10 -0.00 -0.07 0.05 -0.00 -0.02 -0.06 -0.01 -0.07
(-0.94) (-1.29) (-0.26) (-1.21) (-0.44) (-0.84) (0.66) (-0.53) (-0.28) (-0.80) (-0.18) (-1.26)
LP_Winner -0.02 0.00 -0.18 -0.27 -0.20 -0.31 -0.26 -0.36 -0.22 -0.30 -0.18 -0.24
(-0.18) (0.23) (-1.48) (-2.00) (-1.59) (-1.96) (-1.90) (-2.43) (-1.58) (-1.98) (-1.76) (-2.22)
HP_Loser 0.14 0.22 -0.05 -0.01 0.03 0.04 0.33 0.33 0.26 0.24 0.14 0.15
(0.97) (1.40) (-0.32) (-0.08) (0.22) (0.27) (2.11) (2.07) (1.88) (1.52) (1.41) (1.43)
MP_Loser 0.13 0.09 0.30 0.24 0.29 0.25 0.17 0.10 0.09 0.01 0.20 0.16
(1.89) (1.52) (3.77) (2.82) (3.71) (3.05) (2.10) (1.36) (1.16) (0.12) (3.31) (2.54)
LP_Loser 0.05 -0.10 0.16 0.12 0.15 0.14 0.10 0.11 -0.02 -0.03 0.09 0.05
(0.53) (-1.00) (1.69) (1.14) (1.64) (1.40) (1.03) (1.05) (-0.34) (-0.32) (1.25) (0.67)
Avg. obs 827 827 793 793 761 761 730 730 715 715 763 763
S1 0.15 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.27 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.17 0.17
(0.92) (0.66) (0.39) (0.50) (0.50) (0.41) (2.17) (1.94) (1.88) (1.66) (1.68) (1.41)
S2 0.19 0.15 0.33 0.29 0.30 0.28 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.21 0.22
(1.88) (1.65) (3.22) (2.57) (2.94) (2.52) (1.19) (1.08) (1.29) (1.13) (2.91) (2.78)
S3 0.07 -0.10 0.35 0.37 0.35 0.46 0.36 0.47 0.19 0.26 0.26 0.29




We estimate the following cross-sectional regression on a monthly basis between January 1975 and December 2009, )60...2,1(60 j  
1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 ,
7 8 , 9 , 10
52 52 _ 5 _ 5
_ 5 _ 5 _ 5 _ 5
it ojt jt i t jt i t jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j
jt t j jt i t j jt i t j jt
R b b R b Size b wkhW b wkhL b HP yearWinner b MP yearWinner
b LP yearWinner b HP yearLoser b MP yearLoser b LP yearLoser
     
  
       
   ,i t j ijte 
 
itR is the return to stock i in month t .  1itR and 1, tisize are the return and natural logarithm of market capitalisation of stock i in month 1t net of the month 1t cross-sectional 
mean and )52(52 ,, jtijti wkhLoserwkhWinner   is the 52 week high winner (loser) dummy that takes the value of one if the 52-week high measure for stock i is ranked in the top 
(bottom) 30%  in month jt  , and zero otherwise. The 52-week high measure in month jt  is the ratio of the price level in month jt  to the maximum price achieved in months 
12 jt  to jt  . 5-year winner (5-year loser) are defined as performance ( 60 60( ) /t j t j t jP P P     ) in the top (bottom) 30% of all stocks during past 60 months at month t-j.  
HP, MP, and LP are dummies defined as a the three price levels, the top 30%, middle 40%, and bottom 30% of all stocks, in month t-j, respectively. HP_winner (loser), 
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MP_winner (loser), and LP_ winner (loser) are intersections between past 5-year performance groups and price levels. S1, S2, and S3 are defined as 8 5( )b b , 9 4( )b b and 
10 7( )b b , respectively. The coefficient estimates of a given independent variable are averaged over 12,...2,1j for column labelled (1, 12), 24,...14,13j for columns labelled 
(13, 24),…, 60,...2,1j for columns labelled (1,60). The numbers reported in the table are the time-series of averages of these averages in percent per month. Results of control 
variables are omitted. Average observations for each calendar month based on cross-sectional regressions are reported in the last row in Panel A. The accompanying t-statistics are 




Table 5 Fama-French risk-adjusted returns  
















































5-year Winner -0.02 -0.02 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.08 -0.10 -0.05 -0.05
(-0.44) (-0.29) (-1.32) (-1.32) (-1.01) (-0.60) (-0.69) (-0.74) (-1.32) (-1.66) (-1.12) (-0.99)
5-year Loser 0.08 0.02 0.13 0.09 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.24 0.11 0.14 0.15 0.13
(0.94) (0.24) (1.96) (1.18) (2.29) (2.14) (2.64) (2.93) (1.68) (1.93) (2.42) (2.15)
GRS Test 0.75 0.09 3.11 1.62 4.13 3.63 5.77 6.46 3.67 5.04 6.78 5.34
p-value 0.47 0.95 0.04 0.19 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00
Contrarian 0.09 0.04 0.20 0.16 0.22 0.21 0.23 0.28 0.19 0.24 0.20 0.18
Performance (S0) (1.04) (0.37) (2.14) (1.72) (2.44) (2.16) (2.95) (3.17) (2.33) (2.73) (2.90) (2.58)
obs 366 306 366 306 366 306 366 306 366 306 366 306
HP_Winner -0.05 0.03 -0.15 -0.12 -0.08 -0.03 0.04 0.04 -0.05 -0.07 -0.06 -0.04
(-0.76) (0.45) (-1.99) (-1.45) (-1.13) (-0.48) (0.55) (0.51) (-0.71) (-0.95) (-1.11) (-0.51)
MP_Winner 0.03 0.45 0.01 -0.04 -0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.06 -0.07 -0.14 -0.02 -0.06
(0.45) (0.55) (0.06) (-0.53) (-0.02) (-0.43) (-0.30) (-0.61) (-0.94) (-1.67) (-0.33) (-1.00)
LP_Winner 0.22 0.30 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.12 -0.11 -0.14 -0.20 0.00 0.04
(1.83) (2.17) (0.29) (0.09) (0.18) (0.03) (-0.88) (-0.68) (-0.97) (-1.23) (0.03) (0.02)
HP_Loser 0.02 0.02 -0.17 -0.01 0.00 0.02 0.30 0.30 0.17 0.09 0.06 0.06
(0.16) (0.12) (-0.99) (-0.09) (0.03) (0.16) (1.84) (1.65) (1.11) (0.89) (0.56) (0.52)
MP_Loser 0.04 0.00 0.19 0.14 018 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.17 0.13
(0.50) (0.02) (2.31) (1.88) (2.15) (1.91) (1.89) (1.69) (1.98) (1.83) (2.33) (1.98)
LP_Loser 0.12 0.02 0.16 0.14 0.21 0.26 0.22 0.32 0.06 0.15 0.15 0.18
(1.27) (0.07) (1.59) (1.27) (2.16) (2.46) (2.37) (3.14) (0.73) (1.51) (2.11) (2.15)
GRS Test 1.38 1.42 2.59 1.78 2.00 1.83 3.24 2.64 1.86 1.83 3.20 2.97






Table 5 continued 
















































S1 0.07 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.07 0.03 0.26 0.26 0.22 0.16 0.12 0.09
(0.41) (0.11) (-0.14) (-0.08) (0.46) (0.18) (1.52) (1.38) (1.31) (0.84) (1.00) (0.70)
S2 0.06 0.03 0.18 0.15 0.19 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.15
(0.65) (0.28) (1.89) (1.65) (2.01) (1.83) (1.87) (1.68) (2.27) (1.96) (2.42) (2.09)
S3 -0.10 -0.29 0.12 0.11 0.18 0.26 0.34 0.43 0.20 0.35 0.15 0.17
(-0.66) (-1.79) (0.77) (0.63) (1.11) (1.39) (2.17) (2.43) (1.25) (1.91) (1.27) (1.29)
GRS Test 0.34 0.72 1.68 1.09 1.96 1.83 3.35 3.41 3.24 3.25 2.72 2.52
p -value 0.79 0.54 0.11 0.35 0.05 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04
obs 366 306 366 306 366 306 366 306 366 306 366 306
Panel C
 
We estimate the following cross-sectional regression on a monthly basis between July 1979 and December 2009, )60...2,1(60 j   for Panel A.        
ijtjtijtjtijtjtijtjtijttijttijtjtit eyearLoserbyearWinnerbwkhLoserbwkhWinnerbsizebRbbR   ,6,5,4,31,21,10 555252   (1) 
We also estimate the following equation for Panel B. 
1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 ,
7 8 , 9 , 10
52 52 _ 5 _ 5
_ 5 _ 5 _ 5 _ 5
it ojt jt i t jt i t jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j jt i t j
jt t j jt i t j jt i t j jt
R b b R b Size b wkhW b wkhL b HP yearWinner b MP yearWinner
b LP yearWinner b HP yearLoser b MP yearLoser b LP yearLoser
     
  
       
   ,i t j ijte 
(2) 
itR is the return to stock i in month t .  1itR and 1, tisize are the return and natural logarithm of market capitalisation of stock i in month 1t net of the month 1t cross-sectional 
mean and )52(52 ,, jtijti wkhLoserwkhWinner   is the 52 week high winner (loser) dummy that takes the value of one if the 52-week high measure for stock i is ranked in the top 
(bottom) 30%  in month jt  , and zero otherwise. The 52-week high measure in month jt  is the ratio of the price level in month jt  to the maximum price achieved in months 
12 jt  to jt  . 5-year winner (5-year loser) are defined as performance ( 60 60( ) /t j t j t jP P P     ) in the top (bottom) 30% of all stocks during past 60 months at month t-j.  
HP, MP, and LP are dummies defined as a the three price levels, the top 30%, middle 40%, and bottom 30% of all stocks, in month t-j, respectively. HP_winner (loser), 
MP_winner (loser), and LP_ winner (loser) are intersections between past 5-year performance groups and price levels. Contrarian performance (S0) in Panel A is measured by 
buying 5-year losers and selling 5-year winners as ( 6 5b b  ) in Eq(1). S1, S2, and S3 in Panel C are defined as 8 5( )b b , 9 4( )b b and 10 7( )b b  in Eq (2), respectively. The 
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coefficient estimates of a given independent variable are averaged over 12,...2,1j for column labelled (1, 12), 24,...14,13j for columns labelled (13, 24),…, 60,...2,1j for 
columns labelled (1,60). The numbers reported in the table are the time-series of averages of these averages in percent per month. . To obtain risk-adjusted returns, we further run 
times-series of averages (one for each average), which are computed from the cross-sectional regression, on the Fama-French (1996) three-factor model. The intercepts of each 
average is reported in the table. Factor loadings are omitted for brevity. The GRS test is the F-statistic testing the hypothesis that the intercepts in the regressions for relevant 




Table 6 Liquidity adjusted returns         
















































5-year Winner -0.00 0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06 -0.08 -0.10 -0.04 -0.05
(-0.07) (0.72) (-0.52) (-0.59) (-0.64) (-0.67) (-0.47) (-0.79) (-1.32) (-1.66) (-0.72) (-0.78)
5-year Loser 0.02 -0.04 0.14 0.11 0.21 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.11 0.15 0.14 0.13
(0.17) (-0.42) (1.86) (1.63) (2.13) (1.89) (1.98) (1.91) (1.33) (1.78) (1.99) (1.92)
GRS Test 0.45 0.09 2.37 1.51 4.95 6.00 5.77 6.74 4.32 6.05 6.04 4.93
p-value 0.67 0.95 0.09 0.22 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
Contrarian 0.02 0.09 0.18 0.15 0.22 0.25 0.19 0.24 0.17 0.21 0.18 0.19
Performance (S0) (0.17) (0.87) (1.73) (1.60) (2.13) (2.33) (2.01) (2.45) (1.83) (2.19) (2.39) (2.36)
obs 279 233 279 233 279 233 279 233 279 233 279 233
HP_Winner -0.04 0.06 -0.11 -0.11 -0.05 -0.05 0.07 0.05 -0.04 -0.08 -0.03 -0.02
(-0.44) (0.63) (-1.29) (-1.15) (-0.51) (-0.49) (0.91) (0.52) (-0.50) (-0.97) (-0.35) (-0.37)
MP_Winner 0.00 -0.02 0.06 0.00 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.07 -0.08 -0.16 -0.00 -0.03
(0.01) (-0.23) (0.68) (-0.04) (0.26) (-0.28) (-0.23) (-0.72) (-0.96) (-1.82) (-0.07) (-0.72)
LP_Winner 0.27 0.30 0.16 0.14 0.07 0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.08 -0.15 0.07 0.06
(1.88) (1.96) (1.07) (0.81) (0.40) (0.17) (-0.32) (-0.25) (-0.46) (-0.79) (0.57) (0.43)
HP_Loser -0.07 0.02 -0.29 -0.25 -0.14 -0.12 0.26 0.26 0.16 0.08 -0.01 0.00
(-0.32) (0.12) (-1.25) (-0.99) (-0.69) (-0.57) (1.27) (1.10) (0.82) (0.36) (-0.08) (1.00)
MP_Loser -0.01 -0.07 0.19 0.15 0.22 0.20 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.14
(-0.10) (-0.56) (2.11) (1.78) (2.10) (2.01) (1.79) (1.80) (2.34) (1.93) (2.08) (1.93)
LP_Loser -0.01 -0.15 0.11 0.08 0.20 0.24 0.20 0.32 0.02 0.09 0.10 0.12
(-0.11) (-1.18) (0.95) (0.61) (1.85) (1.96) (1.94) (2.17) (0.25) (0.96) (1.27) (1.25)
GRS Test 1.59 1.83 3.29 2.39 2.69 2.71 2.72 3.37 2.13 2.24 2.58 2.83
p-value 0.14 0.09 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04






Table 6 continued 
















































S1 -0.03 0.03 -0.17 -0.02 -0.09 -0.08 0.19 0.26 0.20 0.16 0.02 0.03
(-0.22) (-0.13) (-0.69) (-0.08) (-0.42) (0.32) (0.88) (1.38) (0.96) (0.84) (0.14) (0.15)
S2 -0.01 -0.06 0.13 0.11 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.27 0.25 0.17 0.16
(-0.09) (-0.45) (1.79) (1.56) (2.01) (1.89) (2.03) (1.88) (2.52) (2.42) (2.00) (1.94)
S3 -0.29 -0.50 -0.05 -0.06 0.13 0.26 0.26 0.37 0.11 0.26 0.03 0.06
(-1.50) (-2.51) (-0.29) (-0.28) (0.68) (1.41) (2.00) (2.43) (1.25) (1.24) (0.22) (0.34)
GRS Test 1.70 2.78 1.53 1.05 2.15 2.16 3.50 3.28 4.05 4.01 2.60 2.01
p -value 0.16 0.04 0.20 0.36 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.09
obs 279 233 279 233 279 233 279 233 279 233 279 233
Panel C
 
We estimate the following cross-sectional regression on a monthly basis between October 1986 to December 2009,  )60...2,1(60 j   for Panel A.        
ijtjtijtjtijtjtijtjtijttijttijtjtit eyearLoserbyearWinnerbwkhLoserbwkhWinnerbsizebRbbR   ,6,5,4,31,21,10 555252  
We also estimate the following equation for Panel B. 
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itR is the return to stock i in month t .  1itR and 1, tisize are the return and natural logarithm of market capitalisation of stock i in month 1t net of the month 1t cross-sectional 
mean and )52(52 ,, jtijti wkhLoserwkhWinner   is the 52 week high winner (loser) dummy that takes the value of one if the 52-week high measure for stock i is ranked in the top 
(bottom) 30%  in month jt  , and zero otherwise. The 52-week high measure in month jt  is the ratio of the price level in month jt  to the maximum price achieved in months 
12 jt  to jt  . 5-year winner (5-year loser) are defined as performance ( 60 60( ) /t j t j t jP P P     ) in the top (bottom) 30% of all stocks during past 60 months at month t-j.  
HP, MP, and LP are dummies defined as a the three price levels, the top 30%, middle 40%, and bottom 30% of all stocks, in month t-j, respectively. HP_winner (loser), 
MP_winner (loser), and LP_ winner (loser) are intersections between past 5-year performance groups and price levels. S1, S2, and S3 are defined as 8 5( )b b , 9 4( )b b and 
40 
 
10 7( )b b , respectively. The coefficient estimates of a given independent variable are averaged over 12,...2,1j for column labelled (1, 12), 24,...14,13j for columns labelled 
(13, 24),…, 60,...2,1j for columns labelled (1,60). We take the time-series of averages of these averages in percent per month.  To obtain risk-adjusted returns, we further run 
times-series of averages (one for each average), which are computed from the cross-sectional regression, on the Liu’s (1996) liquidity augmented CAPM model 
(
itifmiii
eLIQsRRbaR  )( ). LIQ is a liquidity factor, which is measured by the return difference between low liquid stocks and high liquid stocks according LM12 in 
month t. We use a 30% cutoff rate to sort LM12 in a given month. The top 30% of stocks in terms of LM12 is low liquid stocks, while the bottom 30% of stocks is high liquid 














 ). 12-month turnover is 
turnover over the prior 12 months, calculated as the sum of daily turnover over the prior 12 months. Daily turnover is the ratio of the number of shares traded on a day to the 








for all sample stocks. We obtain the liquid premium from the low liquid portfolio and the high liquid portfolio on a monthly basis starting from 
October 1986. The intercept in the liquidity augmented CAPM (Liu, 2006) model is the risk-adjusted return for each portfolio. Factor loadings are omitted for brevity. The GRS 
test is the F-statistic testing the hypothesis that the intercepts in the regressions for relevant portfolios (e.g. two portfolios in Panel A, six portfolios in Panel B, and three spreads in 
Panel C) are jointly equal to zero. The total number of months is also reported for the time-series regressions. 
